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authority over the persons, as well as the property, of all citizens who are
under any legal disability,14 as infants,1 5 lunatics and idiots.18
Where a personal right is fortified by a contract, equity unquestionably
has jurisdiction to enjoin a breach of the contract where the remedy at
law is clearly inadeluate. Thus the right of a wife to the sole control of
children under a separation contract, 17 the right of a wife to live separate
from her husband free from his molestation or visits as covenanted in a deed
of separation,18 and the right of freedom from the noise of church bells
during agreed hours19 have been enforced by injunction. This exercise of
equitable jurisdiction to restrain a breach of contract is substantially coinci-
dent with its jurisdiction to decree specific performance.2 0
The present decree may involve the Court in difficulties relative to deter-
mining what conduct will constitute molestation and a violation of the injunc-
tion; also it will not of necessity improve the relations between the litigious
sisters. 2 1 Courts have hesitated to take the step of granting an injunction on
the ground of molestation or annoyance alone.2 2 But in addition to molesta-
tion the defendant here has broken a valid contract for which there is no ade-
quate remedy at law. Certainly an equity court has jurisdiction of in its
sound discretion it believes the injunctive remedy to be practical and effec-
tive.2 3
In its dictum the Court indicates that even in the absence of any contract
it would have protected the plaintiff's natural right to visit her mother without
molestation. This is an announcement of cessation from "unintelligent
adherence to the dicta of a great judge in the pioneer case." 24 There is no
valid reason why preventive justice should not extend to protection of personal
rights. The instant opinion is in line with the growing tendency to repudiate
the theoery that equity has jurisdiction to protect and enforce only property
rights, and expressly recognizes that personal rights can be protected ade-
quately only by a court of equity.2 5  J. W. C.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE PER SE-VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTE OR ORDINANCE.
-Plaintiff, discovering her house on fire, telephoned the fire department. To
reach plaintiff's house, the fire truck had to cross defendant's railroad tracks.
On reaching the tracks the trucks were prevented from continuing by a train
obstructing the crossing. Plaintiff's son informed the engineer that his home
14 Watson v. Watson (1919), 183 Ky. 516, 209 S. W. 524.
15N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bangs (1881), 103 U. S. 435.
16 McCord v. Ochiltree (1846), 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 15; Ashley v. Holman
(1880), 15 S. C. 97.
17 Swift v. Swift (1865), 55 Eng. Reprint 637.
1s Sanders v. Rodway (1852), 51 Eng. Reprint 757.
19 Martin v. Nutkin (1724), 24 Eng. Reprint 724.
20 Advance Oil Co. v. Hunt (1917), 66 Ind. App. 228, 116 N. E. 340.
21 Casenote, 51 Harvard L. Rev. 166.
22 Chappell v. Stewart (1896), 82 Md. 323, 33 A. 542; Ashinsky v. Levenson
(1917), 156 Pa. 14, 100 A. 491.
23 South Side Motor Coach Co. v. McFarland (1934), 207 Ind. 341, 191
N. E. 147.
24 Pound, "Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Person-
ality", 29 Harvard L. Rev. 641.
25 Supra, Note 3, p. 295.
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was on fire. The trainman said he was waiting for a "pusher," and nothing
was done to clear the crossing for about twelve minutes. Plaintiff's house was
destroyed. A state statute made it unlawful for a train to obstruct a crossing
for an unreasonable length of time. Held, the violation of the statute raised
a presumption that defendant was negligent, and defendant having failed to
show that proper care and diligence was exercised was liable.1
With similar facts before it, the Indiana Supreme Court reached the same
result.2 The basis of the Indiana court's decision was that the defendant
railroad company was negligent per ses inasmuch as it had violated the
statute4 which prohibits the permitting of freight trains to remain standing
across any public highway. Since the violation was the "proximate cause"
of plaintiff's damage the defendant was liable. 5
"In every instance before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back
of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining."8
In an action based on negligence resulting from defendant's statutory violation,
defendant has breached a duty owed to the state. In addition, if the statute
is not one which creates an obligation owed to the public "generally," 7 the
court will determine the class of individuals which the legislature intended to
protect and the class of harm which the legislature intended to prevent. If
the plaintiff and his injury fall within these respective classes, the defendant
owed this particular plaintiff a duty, the violation of which per se imposes
I Felter v. Delaware and H. R. Corp. (1937), 19 F. Supp. 852.
2 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Tauer (1911), 176 Ind. 621, 96 N. E. 758.
a Violation of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se in Indiana
notwithstanding the fact that it carries a criminal sanction in addition thereto,
nor the fact that no right of civil action is expressly provided for. Central
Indiana R. Co. v. Wishard (1916), 186 Ind. 262, 114 N. E. 970; Indpls.
Traction etc. v. Hensly (1917), 186 Ind. 479, 115 N. E. 934. See cases cited in
Penna. R. Co. v. Huss (1932), 96 Ind. App. 71, 180 N. E. 919. In the majority
of jurisdictions violation of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se. A few
treat the violation as prima facie negligence (as in the principal case), or
merely as evidence of negligence. See collection of cases in 32 California L.
Rev. 712. As yet violation of a rule or regulation of a governmental commission
or board is not negligence per se in any jurisdiction, but may afford some
evidence of negligence. Schumer v. Caplin (1925), 241 N. Y. 246, 150 N. E.
139, 4 J. Air L. 282.
4 Burns' 1933, sec. 10-3904.
5 In the absence of a statute the decision probably would have been the
same, for the immunity from legal responsibility which a person enjoys for
failure to extend to others assistance when in danger does not extend to conduct
which intentionally or negligently interferes with or prevents a third person
from rendering aid. Northern Assur. Co. v. New York Cent. R. R. Co. (1935),
271 Mich. 569, 260 N. W. 763. See Restatement of Torts, Sections 326-328.
6Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co. (1928), 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99.
7 The difference between a statutory duty that is owed only to the public
generally, and a statutory duty owed to individuals is that the former is to
promote some community interest, as the preservation of Sunday as a Holy day.
A duty not to drive on Sunday is not negligence per se. Tingle v. Chicago
B. & 0. R. Co. (1882), 60 Iowa 333, 14 N. W. 320. Whereas in the latter case
it is to protect some definite group of individuals against specific hazards, as
the risk of collision with fellow travelers and pedestrians on the highway.
To violate a duty to drive at a certain rate of speed is negligence per se.
Fox v. Barchcman (1912), 178 Ind. 572, 99 N. E. 989.
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civil liability.8 Of course, the plaintiff must be free from any contributory
negligence, and the conduct of the defendant that violated the statute must
be the cause in fact of plaintiff's injury.
In an action founded on negligence where no statute is involved, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant violated the duty of care which he
owed to plaintiff, that is, the defendant's conduct must not have fallen below
that of an ordinary and reasonable man under the same or similar circum-
stances. This standard would in most cases be for the jury to determine,
having regard to all the facts under which the injury occurred, 9 the customs
and mores of the community, 1 0 the personal qualities of the actor 1 1 and other
like circumstances. There is no place for the "ordinarily reasonable man" in
the negligence per se doctrine. The theory is that our old friend wouldn't
violate a statute or ordinance. 12
The Indiana Court1 3 in using the indivious term, "proximate cause,"
completely confuses and overlooks the duty problem involved. The "proximate
cause" question is in most cases for the jury to decide. Therefore, by introduc-
ing the element of proximate cause, the whole principle of the doctrine of
negligence per se is destroyed, for it isn't for the jury to say if the defendant
could have reasonably anticipated and foreseen the particular harm which the
particular plaintiff sustained, but it is the ftnction of the judge to interpret
S Although modern courts repudiate the old doctrine of giving effect to the
"equity of a statute", based on the assumption of power by the court to mould
the statute to suit the court's idea of wisdom and expediency, the same result
is accomplished by saying as the court did in Holy Trinity Church v. U. S.
(1892), 143 U. S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511, "the evil which was sought to be remedied
interprets the statute." "General legislative purpose in statutes of general
public concern is at times discoverable, but to credit the legislature, taken
collectively, with intention expressed' in unequivocal terms upon specific
statutory provisions seems difficult if not impossible." Horack, Frank, E. Jr.,
In the Name of Legislative Intention, 38 West Virginia L. Q. 119.
9 Of course, even in an action of negligence per se, if there is a mere
technical violation of the statute and any thinking person would have found
it unreasonable not to have violated it, then the judge should give such
instructions as would allow the jury to find that the defendant wasn't negligent.
McElhimney v. Knittle et al. (1925), 199 Iowa 278, 201 N. W. 586. See 19
Minn. L. Rev. 676."
10 But in an action of negligence per se--"We do not think that an estab-
lished custom * * * can avail Is against the positive requirements of the
statute or ordinance." Stultz v. Thomas (1921), 182 N. Car. 470, 109 S. E. 361.
11 Harper, Law of Torts (1933), Sec. 71: "In general a defendant's personal
idiosyncrasies do not affect the standard of conduct to which he must conform,
but there are some situations in which it would be so unfair to apply such an
external test that some consideration is given to the personal qualities of the
actor."
12 "Now this ordinary prudent man of common law creation must in the
nature of things be regarded as a law-abiding citizen to whom it would be
unjust reproach to suppose that knowing the statute-for upon familiar
principles he can claim no benefit from his ignorance of it-he would break it,
reasonably believing that it was a prudent thing for him to do, and that in
all probability no harm would come of it." Evers v. Davis (1914), 86 N. J. L
196, 90 A. 677.
18Supra, note 2.
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the statute and see if the legislature intended to prevent this type of harm and
to protect the class of individuals to which plaintiff belonged.1 4
Considering the difficulties encountered in an attempt to rationalize the
doctrine of negligence per se so that it will be consistent with the principles
involved in the concept of negligence as generally understood, and in view
of the arduous task which confronts the courts in discovering the unexpressed
legislative purpose to benefit individuals, one is almost compelled to believe
that there is some policy which induced the court's decisions in many cases,
other than merely a desire to compensate the plaintiff for his injury. The
courts sedulously avoid mentioning it, but it is submitted that judicial notice
is taken of the inadequate penalties that some statutes provide 1 5 or perhaps the
inefficient and dilatory law enforcement machinery that prevails in many
communities. Having this in mind the courts create an additional sanction
by imposing civil liability in favor of persons harmed as a result of the
violation.
It cannot reasonably be disputed that this factor is the underlying basis
of the holdings in such cases as where merely a licensing statute has been
violated. 1 6 Nor can it be denied that the imposition of civil liability as a
supplementory means of enforcing the legislative policy becomes apparent in
cases where the courts disallow the defense of contributory negligence, and
hold the defendant responsible in solido as the criminal law does. 1 7 In many
jurisdictions that purport to apply the doctrine of negligence per se, cause
in fact between the defendant's violation of the statute and the plaintiffs
injury is the sole element necessary to make defendant liable.1 8 In one juris-
diction not even that much is required.1 9 It would be the grossest subterfuge
to label such actions "negligence."
Often a person finds that it would be more costly to do the things which
a statute prescribes than to be occasionally subjected to a small fine. Requir-
ing him to pay compensation to one who is injured as a result of this violation
14Proximate cause involves not only a sufficient connection in time and
space, but most important is the foreseeability factor, i. e., could the defendant
have reasonably anticipated the particular harm to the particular plaintiff?
If the defendant is said to have been negligent per se, it means that he has
violated a duty owed the plaintiff which embraced the harm that the plaintiff
sustained, which duty was imposed by the legislature. If the breach of duty
substantially contributed to the plaintiff's injury (was the cause in fact), he
is liable. It is for the judge to determine the general sort of risk or class of
harm anticipated by the legislature and the class of persons as to whom the
legislature anticipated harm. Whether an ordinary reasonable man could have
foreseen the harm to the plaintiff is irrelevant for we have seen that the
reasonable man has no place in the negligent per se doctrine. Supra note 12.
15 In Westerwelt v. Dives (1911), 231 Pa. 548, 80 A. 1054, the court held
that "if a plain duty is imposed for the benefit of an individual, and the penalty
is obviously inadequate to compel performance, the implication will be strong,
if not conclusive that the penalty was meant to be cumulative to such remedy
as the law gives when a dxty to an individual is neglected."
16 Dudly v. Northampton St. Ry. (1909), 202 Mass. 44-3, 89 N. E. 25.
17 Chapin v. Ann Arbor R. Co. (1911), 167 Mich. 648, 133 N. W. 512.
18 Short v. Penna. R. Co. (1933), 46 Ohio App. 77, 187 N. E. 737; Scott v.
Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R. Co. (1929), 222 Mo. App., 22 S. W. (2nd) 654.
19 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Davis (1900), 104 Tenn. 442, 58-S. W. 296.
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of the statute would unquestionably tend to secure more effective protection of
society against this unsocial individual. 2 0
It is submitted that, providing this additional sanction factor is definitely
and unqualifiedly recognized by the courts in dealing with tort cases which
involve the violation of a criminal statute or ordinance, the class of persons
for whose benefit the law was made should be liberally interpreted; and
attention should be focused on the general objective which the legislature
sought, and as a consequence broaden the class of harms intended to be
prevented. J. M. C.
CONTRACTS-INSANrrY AS AFFECTING VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTs.-In a recent
case a father transferred $9,000 worth of bonds to his son in pursuance to an
agreement that the latter care for him the remainder of his life. Several
months later, after the father's death, the administrators of the estate brought
an action against the son for replevin of the bonds, claiming that the father had
been incapable of managing his own affairs, that the son had knowledge of this
fact, and that a guardian had been appointed for the father a few months
after the transfer. No allegation as to fraud or undue influence was made.
The son showed that there had been an attempted distribution of the bonds
but that this had failed, and that a short time thereafter the father came to
live with him; and that he then took the bonds as consideration for his promise
to keep the parent the remainder of his natural life. The Appellate Court
of Indiana affirmed a decision for the administrators upon the ground that
"where an unconscionable advantage is taken of persons of unsound mind
before they have been placed under guardianship, by one possessing knowledge
of such condition, the contract attempted to be entered into is absolutely invalid,
void, and of no force or effect."'
The Indiana courts have followed the majority rule of this country by
holding that a contract entered into by an insane person before an adjudica-
tion of insanity or before the appointment of a guardian is merely voidable.2
20 As in Buenner Chair Co. v. Feulner (1901), 28 Ind. App. 479, 63 N. E.
239, the owner of a factory probably found it to be more economical to leave
his machinery unguarded even if it necessitated being subjected to an occa-
sional fine. However, the court by holding him liable to an employee injured
by the unguarded machinery, perhaps changed his mind.
I Warner v. Warner (1937), 10 N. E. (2d) 773.
2 Crouse v. Holman (1862), 19 Ind. 30; Somers v. Pumphrey (1865), 24
Ind. 231; Devin v. Scott (1870), 34 Ind. 67; Musselman v. Cravens (1874),
47 Ind. 1; Nichol v. Thomas (1876), 53 Ind. 42; Freed v. Brown (1876), 55
Ind. 310; Wray v. Chandler (1878), 64 Ind. 146; Hardenbrook v. Sherwood,
Guard. (1880), 72 Ind. 403; McClain v. Davis (1881), 77 Ind. 419; Schuff
v. Ransom (1881), 79 Ind. 458; Fay v. Burdett (1882), 81 Ind. 433, 42 Am.
Rep. 142; Copenrath v. Kienby (1882), 83 Ind. 18; Fulwider v. Ingels, Guard.
(1882), 87 Ind. 414; North-Western Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Blankenship
(1883), 94 Ind. 535, 48 Am. Rep. 185; Physio-Medical College of Indiana v.
Wilkinson (1886), 108 Ind. 314, 9 N. E. 167; Bayer v. Berrymanj (1889),
123 Ind. 451, 24 N. E. 249; Ashmead v. Reynolds (1890), 127 Ind. 441, 26
N. E. 80; Louisville, etc. Railway Co. v. Herr (1893), 135 Ind. 591, 35 N. E.
556; McMillan v. Deering & Co. (1894), 139 Ind. 70, 38 N. E. 398; Gellen-
waters v. Campbell (1895), 142 Ind. 529, 41 N. E. 1041; Teegarden et ux v.
